CONFIDENTIAL
the president should set out some basic principles and to Iina a way to repeat them publicly, before the press. Scowcroft had suggested that this might not be enough but it was better than nothing. what we could not do was to go on to Maastricht with the American position remaining unclear. He reminded Mr Wolfowitz that the list of areas for joint EC action set out in the Franco-German proposals included relations with the United States. It was very odd indeed to put relations with the United States on a parallel with the USSR or the Mangreb.
5. Mr Wolfowitz said that he took this latter point. So far the Americans naa Iocussed on the proposeu rranco-German corps. MI Hadley added that the relationship between WEU and NATO and between WEU and the EC had also been at the centre of American's concern. Sir D Gillmore repeated that WEU ought to be autonomous. If it were not it would in time become the nucleus of a European ministry of defence. We could not allow ourselves to get into a position whereby the Europeans presented faits accomplis to the Alliance.
6.
Mr Wolfowitz suggested that it would be difficult for the Americans to set out a line relating to the European Court of Justice. He realised the importance of the issue, though it was a new one for him. Sir D Gillmore said that the British hoped to kick the idea into touch. But the Americans could nonetheless get at the concept by repeating their opposition to any form or binding EC caucus. Mr Hadley said that that was why the Administration had set out their five principles which had been agreed at Copenhagen. He referred among others to the principle that NATO was a forum for consultation and the forum for decision. We ought not perhaps to concede that it was too late to do anything about communique language but to press the point as soon as possible. He suggested that we should look at the five principles again to see how and where a sharper edge should be put on them. This could also form part of the background to work on a possible statement by the President.
7. Sir D Gillmore said there was no reason why the debate should not in fact come out well enougn ir all those concerned negotiatea seriously. Mr Wolfowitz noted that we had allies for our point of view in NATO. sir D Gillmore said that the argument that the French and Germans had seen advantage in the proposal for a Franco-German corps as a way of getting the French off the hook of their earlier declaration that they would pull their forces out of Germany was not convincing. in getting off one nook they nad impaled themselves on a worse one. It was impossible to see what the mission of the proposed Franco-German force might be.
8.
Mr Wolfowitz concluded by saying how helpful he had found the meeting. He took the point that the time might well have come for the Americans to set down some further markers. He also understood that Sir D Gillmore believed a constructive outcome to the current debate was not only possible but attainable. He agreed we should work for that.
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AM WOOD
zy ucluber, 1991
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