CONFIDENTIAL
From: Minister
Date: 28 uccoder, 1991
cc:
Sir David Gillmore
Minister (C)
Head of Chancery
Mr Tebbit
Mr Torry
ML
DŁOWIE
Private Secretary
PUS'S CALL ON DOD UNDER-SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ:
28 October, 1991
1. Sir D Gillmore told Mr Wolfowitz he had been disturbed in talking that day at the State Department by what Mr Solomon had had
Mr Wolfowitz said we were to say about Korean nuclear ambitions.
right to be anxious. Korea might be the next Iraq.
2. Sir D Gillmore said that he had also spoken on 28 October to Mr Nilec, Mr Comport, Mr Barthlomew and General Scowcroft mainly about. the European security and defence identity. Mr Wolfowitz thought we saw very much eye to eye. Those working in the Pentagon were conscious among other things of the corrosive consequences of getting ESDI wrong for public support for the US forces in Europe. The French tended to talk out of both sides of their mouths at once, arguing that they wanted American troops to stay but also that Europe had to prepare against the day of their departure. agreed with Sir D Gillmore that the latter was all too likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Sir D Gillmore said that what applied to Washington could in the end apply also to London. wondered as to the continuing possibility of substantial British public support for what amounted to a British Expeditionary Force on the continent once the Americans had gone.
He
He
3. Mr Wolfowitz said that German reactions and explanations had been reassuring. But even hot air could have a bad effect on Congress. Sir D Gillmore said that all our experience in the EC suggested that there were consequences even from talk which related more to aspirations than practical possibilities, particularly when treaty language was employed. He explained the way the European Court of Justice fitted into the system. That meant that if CFSP
The Rome came under the treaty we were into a whole new situation. Summit would be crucial. There were those who misrepresented the US position. We had to stick to certain essential principles: parallel and competitive structures should be avoided; NATO alone should be responsible for the defence of Western Europe; the WEU should not be subordinated to the European Community. Many of the UK's EC partners looked to put CFSP under the treaty. General Scowcroft had been taken with the idea of laying down some principles at the Summit. He could not stress too much how important this current watershed was.
4.
Mr Wolfowitz asked what we should be doing at Rome. Should the United States act on its own? Sir D Gillmore said that it was perhaps too late to work for sharper communique language.
Instead
/the
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