SECRET UK EYES A LOCSEN
expensive relocation is to be avoided), by keeping RAF Sek Kong open as late as possible to provide the necessary infrastructure. There are penalties, however, to this option and despite reducing supporting manpower and equipment to the absolute minimum needed to sustain flying operations, there would be:
a. A less than satisfactory timescale to handover/backload RAF
and AAC assets.
b.
Kong
A wasteful use of manpower; the remainder of the base at Sek
might well have closed, leaving RAF Sek Kong
isolated and vulnerable from a security
administratively
viewpoint.
16.
It is recommended therefore that either RN helicopters based
afloat on either the CVS or the LPD should undertake the final tasking
at some point. Alternatively, the remaining
the remaining helicopters from 28 Squadron RAF could embark on the avalable ships at a suitable date prior to the withdrawal and operate from ship to shore.
Conclusions
17. Any military force that is to remain until 30 June 1997 should
be credible and maintain a limited capability to assist the HKG. It
is assessed that such a force should consist of sea and air elements,
and a ground force based around a UK battalion group. It will reduce
for administrative purposes as the final days approach; with the last element possibly as small as a company group for participation in any suitable ceremonies to mark the transfer of sovereignty.
18.
The force will be unaccompanied; will not have the benefit of LEP or LEC support; must have the ability to be self sufficient and should
be centralised, ideally in one base. Stonecutters is deemed to be the
most suitable for this purpose as it is the most accessible and may
E - 9
LOCSEN
UK EYES A
SECRET
Page 285Page 286
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.