TNAG-2238-FCO40-3217-Future-of-Hong-Kong-Royal-Navy-presence-1991 — Page 118

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Redacted Under FOI Exemption Sec 27(1)

Secondly there is the

Governor's assessment, made in the aftermath of the

events of June 1989, that the Hong Kong community needed

some reassurance from the continuing presence of the

Royal Navy Patrol Craft as a visible sign of British Sovereignty. Early withdrawal would undermine our efforts to demonstrate our commitment to the territory.

4. MOD officials accept that there is a political case for retaining the Royal Naval presence afloat. Notwithstanding the advice of Commander British Forces Hong Kong, MOD

officials continue to maintain that there has been no

substantive change in the military case in itself is

therefore insufficiently strong to justify the retention of

a Royal Navy presence. Consequently they are reluctant to

see this additional commitment displace other items of

greater military priority in the fence budget.

The Current Position on Talks

5. The Hong Kong Government has insisted that the basic DCA

cost sharing arrangements 65% to Hong Kong Government, 35% to MOD must remain in place. They argue this for two main

reasons: firstly to vary the arrangements would require

Finance Committee's approval and the issue would be a highly

controversial one; secondly they fear that the arrangements

established for the three patrol craft could set a precedent

for any other variations to the Garrison Withdrawal Plan.

6.

Attitudes on both sides have hardened since negotiations were first started in early 1990. It originally seemed that

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