(6)
SECRET
Redacted Under FOI Exemption Sec 27(1)
Secondly there is the
Governor's assessment, made in the aftermath of the
events of June 1989, that the Hong Kong community needed
some reassurance from the continuing presence of the
Royal Navy Patrol Craft as a visible sign of British Sovereignty. Early withdrawal would undermine our efforts to demonstrate our commitment to the territory.
4. MOD officials accept that there is a political case for retaining the Royal Naval presence afloat. Notwithstanding the advice of Commander British Forces Hong Kong, MOD
officials continue to maintain that there has been no
substantive change in the military case in itself is
therefore insufficiently strong to justify the retention of
a Royal Navy presence. Consequently they are reluctant to
see this additional commitment displace other items of
greater military priority in the fence budget.
The Current Position on Talks
5. The Hong Kong Government has insisted that the basic DCA
cost sharing arrangements 65% to Hong Kong Government, 35% to MOD must remain in place. They argue this for two main
reasons: firstly to vary the arrangements would require
Finance Committee's approval and the issue would be a highly
controversial one; secondly they fear that the arrangements
established for the three patrol craft could set a precedent
for any other variations to the Garrison Withdrawal Plan.
6.
Attitudes on both sides have hardened since negotiations were first started in early 1990. It originally seemed that
BATAJR/3
SECRET