Hong Kong
13. Turning to Hong Kong, BG Yeo commented that the Chinese wanted to make "one country, two systems" work. But the new airport had been presented as a confidence building measure and, because of this, had been treated by the Chinese as a political, rather than an economic, problem. Lord Caithness acknowledged that we had not handled the airport issue as well as we might. All concerned saw the need for a new airport but the plans had become a sovereignty/political issue rather than a practical one. The Chinese were suspicious that we wanted to drain Hong Kong. This was far from the truth, It was a matter of national pride (face) for us that Hong Kong remained strong. We needed to convince the Chinese that we wanted to work with them to get the right solutions within the Joint Declaration. The High Commissioner said that anything the Singaporeans could do to help build up confidence and underline our sincerity would be much appreciated; the Chinese were more likely to listen to Singapore than to us or our European partners. BG Yeo nodded his willingness to consider this. Lord Caithness said that the crunch would come not in 1997 but in the next two to three years. So the airport issue was important. But so was the authority of the Hong Kong Government.
14. BG Yeo commented that the key to the future lay with the Hong Kong Chinese. We needed to continue recruiting new entrants to the Civil Service, the judiciary etc. The Hong Kong Chinese needed their own authority, credibility, and ability to deal with Beijing. We needed also to persuade the Chinese that although they could, if they wished, simply inherit a prosperous southern Chinese city, Hong Kong would be a poorer place without the international component. Singapore would help. The economic well-being of Hong Kong and Singapore were closely linked. Singapore would inevitably be affected by whatever happened in Hong Kong. But the Singapore Government needed to have a clear sense of its own place and scale. The Chinese listened to the Singaporeans because Singapore did not represent a threat to China.
15. Lord Caithness invited BG Yeo to pay an official visit to Britain.
16. The meeting concluded at 1320 and the participants were joined for Lunch by Kishore Mahbubani, Peter Ho, A Selvarajah and M Mitchell.
Japan
17.
Over Lunch, Lord Caithness, referring to Japan's economic muscle and growing military might, asked whether Singapore considered Japan to be an opportunity or a threat. BG Yeo replied that Singapore needed Japanese investment and technology transfer. Military expansionism was certainly a concern to countries such as Korea and China. Shgapore could afford to take a more relaxed view. He was not, for example, concerned about the fact that the Japanese were sending Minesweepers to the Gulf.
18. The High Commissioner asked for reactions to the speech made that morning by Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu. Messrs Mahbubani and Ho both expressed scepticism about Japanese "contrition" and wondered about its sincerity. PG Yeo said it was necessary to compare the formula used with that expressed by the Japanese to Korea. The Koreans (and Chinese) had suffered far more at the hands of the Japanese than had Singapore and would remain deeply suspicious.
6 May 1991
Cc:
PS/Lord Caithness
SEAD
4
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