22-APR-1991
17:36
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS BR
852 840 1976
P.07
Of
all out tiis true owner merely on the strength of the fact of possession, the wrongful occupier of an office này validly exercise its powers as against memberS of the public merely on the strength of his authority de facto. Both titles to land and uniawful administrative acts ATR subject to * similar principle of relativity. many legal situations it is a mistake to Suppose that the consequences of invalidity should be worked out witn rigid logic and without regard to facts.
Rot
In
In a number of reported cases the possibility of authority de facto dões
seem to have been argueú, for example where the Privy Council ser aside penalties for bribery imposed by the Bribery Commission in Ceylon because the commissioners had not been appointed by the proper body, and where the High Court declared a trial void because the deputy recorded was છે solicitoz and not A barrister as required by statute
Dr.
++
Rübinstein in his book entitled Jurisdiction and Illegality sets out at paye 208 the definition of tais doctrine from the Corpus Juris Secundum.
→
"A juuge de facto is one acting with colour of right and who is regarded ab, and has the reputation of, exercising the judicial function he assumės; he differs, on the one hand, from a Mede usurper Of ап offica who undertakes to act without any colour of right; and on the other, from ап officer de jure who is in all respecta legally appointed and qualified
exercise the office."
The origin of the doctrine appears to date from the turbulent times of the Wars of the Roses where such rule was perhaps needed to give de facto recognition to the results of shifts of power caused by armed conflicts. The rule
pa en described by a New York Court as
nas
14
essentia 1 to the pr ervation of order.
security of private rights, and che due enforcement
laws.
the
"
(Curtin V. Barton (1893) .39 N.X. 505 at 511.
20'd
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