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votes (except as otherwise provided in the Btself) is that a majority is sufficient.
7.
Deprived of that device, and of any external
(i.e. U.K.) mechanism for entrenchment, the possibilities are somewhat limited. This is particularly true in
a territory where robust electoral politics have such difficulty finding acceptance.
8.
The best that can be done, I think, is to impose some kind of process for change which will prevent panic amendments and ensure as much public debate as possible before the adoption of a change.
9.
I would suggest a provision to the effect
that a bill to amend or abridge the Bill of Rights cannot
be submitted for the assent of the Governor unless
(a)
(b)
J
it has been approved in identical terms by LegCo in two separate sessions, between which an election for all elected members has been
held; and
at least one year has elapsed between the
first introduction of the bill in LegCo and
the final vote on second approval of it.
This borrows something of the approach taken in the Parliament Acts of 1911 (c.13) and 1949 (c.103) where
the veto powers of the House of Lords were curtailed.
The effect of those statutes is to require the expiry
of at least one year, between the first second-reading and the second third-reading in the House of Commons of any non-money bill, where the House of Lords has refused to approve such bill. There is, of course, no requirement of an intervening election in the British legislation.
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