TNAG-2120-FCO40-3026-Hong-Kong-Garrison-future-of-the-Royal-Navy-presence-1990 — Page 156

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ould satisfy the remaining 2 requirements in parallel.

Thus,

2 PC are already redundant, but their withdrawal immediately

after the deployment of MARPOL's first 2 new SC launches in

1987 would be unrealistically premature. In particular, it

would have significant repercussions with regard to the sensitive

issue of maintenance of LEP/LEC confidence. It is therefore

recommended that all 5 PC continue to serve in Hong Kong in

accordance with the existing DCA agreement until this expires

in Mar 88. Thereafter, HKG is unlikely to be prepared to

contribute to the cost of operation of the first 2 redundant

PC; the utilisation of these 2 vessels post Mar 88 is the

subject of further study. There will be a continuing requirement

for 3 PC at least until MARPOL's second batch of 3 improved-

capability SC launches have assumed the RN's anti-II role İnot

not before 1991. Our options for the future of these 3 PC in

Hong Kong will remain wider, and we will preserve flexibility, if we defer a decision on this subject until 1990 (see Annex A

para 2(a) serial 4). By that date clearer assessments of the need

for a RN presence and of the risks of withdrawal may be possible.

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58. In deciding the future of the PC particularly if the

force was to be split operational, training, engineering,

logistic and financial penalties will need to be taken into

account. Also, the role of the Hong Kong PC in support of

the FPDA and activities in the Pacific region are commitments

which need to be reconsidered. However, these matters have no

direct bearing on the role of the PC in Hong Kong and will

be addressed as separate issues outside the scope of this

paper.

ROW 19(5)37

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