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ould satisfy the remaining 2 requirements in parallel.
Thus,
2 PC are already redundant, but their withdrawal immediately
after the deployment of MARPOL's first 2 new SC launches in
1987 would be unrealistically premature. In particular, it
would have significant repercussions with regard to the sensitive
issue of maintenance of LEP/LEC confidence. It is therefore
recommended that all 5 PC continue to serve in Hong Kong in
accordance with the existing DCA agreement until this expires
in Mar 88. Thereafter, HKG is unlikely to be prepared to
contribute to the cost of operation of the first 2 redundant
PC; the utilisation of these 2 vessels post Mar 88 is the
subject of further study. There will be a continuing requirement
for 3 PC at least until MARPOL's second batch of 3 improved-
capability SC launches have assumed the RN's anti-II role İnot
not before 1991. Our options for the future of these 3 PC in
Hong Kong will remain wider, and we will preserve flexibility, if we defer a decision on this subject until 1990 (see Annex A
para 2(a) serial 4). By that date clearer assessments of the need
for a RN presence and of the risks of withdrawal may be possible.
<
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ie
58. In deciding the future of the PC particularly if the
force was to be split operational, training, engineering,
logistic and financial penalties will need to be taken into
account. Also, the role of the Hong Kong PC in support of
the FPDA and activities in the Pacific region are commitments
which need to be reconsidered. However, these matters have no
direct bearing on the role of the PC in Hong Kong and will
be addressed as separate issues outside the scope of this
paper.
ROW 19(5)37
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