TNAG-2022-FCO40-2884-Chinese-use-of-force-in-respect-of-Hong-Kong-1990 — Page 41

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19 MAR 1990

430

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SECRET

From:

RJT McLaren

Date:

5 January 1990

CC:

Mr Gillmore

Mr Paul, HKD

CHINESE USE OF FORCE IN RESPECT OF HONG KONG

Α

1. Mr Maude has asked what contingency plans exist for the

eventuality of a Chinese use of force in respect of Hong Kong.

2

B

2. So far as I am aware no detailed work has been done on this

question for a number of years, apart from the recent Cabinet Office

exercise on contingency planning for a mass exodus from Hong Kong.

It has long been assumed that Hong Kong would be militarily

indefensible against a major Chinese attack. Since the signature of

the Joint Declaration the threat of a Chinese attack on Hong Kong has been assessed as very low. Deng Xiaoping has referred more

than once (though not recently) to the possibility that the Chinese might reconsider the timetable for the recovery of sovereignty in the event of major disturbances or "chaos" in Hong Kong but we have

always taken this as a reminder that the British must keep the

situation under control in the run up to 1997. There has been ample

evidence in earlier JLG discussions that the Chinese do not want to

see too rapid a run down of British forces.

3. The Hong Kong garrison (currently about 7,000 strong but due to decline to about 1,000 by 1997) is available to help the Hong Kong Government to maintain internal security and to sustain confidence in British sovereignty in the territory until

1997. According to the CBF's Directive, one of the garrison's task is to demonstrate UK sovereignty over Hong Kong by "maintaining the capability to deploy an appropriate range of military responses in

the event of an incursion, threat of incursion, or any other infringements of Hong Kong's territorial integrity, in accordance

with political direction at the time".

ASHABS

SECRET