TNAG-1990-FCO40-2823-Broadcasting-in-Hong-Kong-1989 — Page 76

CONFIDENTIAL

7.

With the complication of the Zhou Nan visit particularly in

mind, we have carefully considered whether there is any better

option than that recommended by the Governor. The alternatives

are:

C

would be consistent with the line

(a) to ban the film. This

taken in the past (such a course of action was recommended by Mr Hum

in his submission of 14 April 1987 and endorsed by Ministers).

But, as the Governor has pointed out, the terms of the new film

censorship legislation mean that different considerations apply.

If a ban was (as seems likely) overturned on appeal, the Hong Kong

Government would lose credibility with the community and its

inability to control the showing of politically sensitive films in

Hong Kong would be clearly demonstrated to the Chinese.

(b) to delay a decision until 21 February. Such a course

might mean that the film would not be shown in Hong Kong during the

visit (the Governor estimates a time lag of up to 2 weeks between

permission being granted to the distributor and the film being

shown). But the key point is that, in order to present the decision

in the best possible light, the Hong Kong Government would

need to explain to the NCNA the reasons for the decision as soon as

it was taken. The Chinese would therefore be aware of it before

Zhou Nan's arrival.

(c) to go ahead as quickly as possible. The Governor hopes

that in this way the worst of the trouble will have passed before

the Zhou Nan visit. But it would almost certainly mean that the film would be shown while Zhou Nan was in Hong Kong.

Conclusions

8.

None of the options set out above is at all satisfactory.

In any event, we must brace ourselves for a strong protest from the Chinese, both in Hong Kong and Peking. The coincidence of the

timing of the affair with the Zhou Nan visit is an additional

/tiresome

CONFIDENTIAL