CONFIDENTIAL
7.
With the complication of the Zhou Nan visit particularly in
mind, we have carefully considered whether there is any better
option than that recommended by the Governor. The alternatives
are:
C
would be consistent with the line
(a) to ban the film. This
taken in the past (such a course of action was recommended by Mr Hum
in his submission of 14 April 1987 and endorsed by Ministers).
But, as the Governor has pointed out, the terms of the new film
censorship legislation mean that different considerations apply.
If a ban was (as seems likely) overturned on appeal, the Hong Kong
Government would lose credibility with the community and its
inability to control the showing of politically sensitive films in
Hong Kong would be clearly demonstrated to the Chinese.
(b) to delay a decision until 21 February. Such a course
might mean that the film would not be shown in Hong Kong during the
visit (the Governor estimates a time lag of up to 2 weeks between
permission being granted to the distributor and the film being
shown). But the key point is that, in order to present the decision
in the best possible light, the Hong Kong Government would
need to explain to the NCNA the reasons for the decision as soon as
it was taken. The Chinese would therefore be aware of it before
Zhou Nan's arrival.
(c) to go ahead as quickly as possible. The Governor hopes
that in this way the worst of the trouble will have passed before
the Zhou Nan visit. But it would almost certainly mean that the film would be shown while Zhou Nan was in Hong Kong.
Conclusions
8.
None of the options set out above is at all satisfactory.
In any event, we must brace ourselves for a strong protest from the Chinese, both in Hong Kong and Peking. The coincidence of the
timing of the affair with the Zhou Nan visit is an additional
/tiresome
CONFIDENTIAL