SECRET UK EYES A
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was shown in SPYGLASS by the Commander of the Northern Army (General Shima Camberley trained in 1974) and DESO may wish to encourage TEMI to arrange a loan through DA Tokyo to foster further interest in TI systems where I saw no Japanese equivalent during my visit.
32.
In my conversations with the 3 Service COS or their deputies I found, under the surface, that they were frustrated by the major constitutional and environmental constraints which limit their training and operational effectiveness. The general impression was that they did not enjoy widespread public support and they appeared to have little, if any, influence on the formulation of defence policy and the strategy needed to sustain it in a changing world. I was, however, impressed by the sharpness of those troops I saw in the Northern Army and the equipment they demonstrated to me. The major weakness I perceived throughout my visit was the total absence of any joint operational doctrine, planning or exercises. In my discussions with the COS of the United States Command, he confirmed that the 3 Japanese defence services do not practice joint operations and effectively lack a joint command system. Given their most likely operational role - the air, sea and land defence of Northern Japan from Soviet attack and the closure of the 3 air/sea lanes through which the Soviet Southern Fleet must exit to the Pacific, it seems extraordinary that the 3 Services continue to work in such totally watertight compartments. In my last call on General Ishii, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (CDS nearest equivalent), he acknowledged that they had much to learn about joint operations and would welcome a better understanding of UK organisations and practice.
33. Setting these impressions against our own defence priorities in relation to Japan, I see some limited but worthwhile opportunities. In terms of defence exports we are likely to remain at the margins of the US relationship (although FS-X could still just go sour), but there are still worthwhile opportunities to pursue. In this category I would put as a first priority the 81mm Mortar, sub-systems for FS-X, and TI equipment (with an early demonstration of SPYGLASS through DA Tokyo). Thereafter, we should keep in close touch with opportunities that may still arise unexpectedly as Japan increasingly seeks its opportunities without undermining its fundamental relationship with the United States.
34.
More widely, I believe we might further our defence objectives with Japan after the June 1989 Naval Staff Talks by broadening their scope to include a wider range of defence issues. In suggesting this to Gen Ishii, without any formal commitments on either side at this stage, I received a very positive response. I therefore recommend that we consider initiating UK/Japan Defence Staff Talks from 1990 using DA Tokyo to handle our detailed proposals.
In
35. I was also struck by the similarities between the Winter Warfare training requirements of the Northern Japanese Army in Hokkaido and our own needs for operations in Northern Norway. addition to our usual range of staff training I have therefore suggested, again without commitment, that we consider offering an
F VVISREPS/1
9 of 10 SECRET UK EYES A
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