1
BECRET UK EYES A
23. Our DA in Manila re-established this post less than 2 years ago. I found him immensely well informed based on his extensive visits to units outside Manila, where he has been tireless and imaginative in getting to the nub of things. He is also well known and highly respected by all the senior personalities I met during my visit. He and his wife have done an excellent job in particularly difficult circumstances in the Philippines and I believe he would serve us well in another more senior DA appointment, possibly nearer home, when his time comes to move.
24. I am most grateful to HMA, the DA and their staff for their support and hospitality on this interesting and useful visit.
JAPAN 10-16 MAY 89
25. My first visit to Japan coincided with the continuing crisis within the Government as the Prime Minister, having announced his resignation over the Recruit COSMOS affair, repeatedly failed to persuade his chosen successor to take office. In the light of this state of political turbulence and uncertainty, it was interesting that most people seemed totally unconcerned about alleged scandal in high places in government and thought it would have little effect on the Country as a whole.
26. In contrast, one or 2 defence related issues do now appear to be coming into sharper focus. These could eventually influence Japanese (self) defence thinking and cause her to become more outward looking in defence and foreign policy matters. None of these matters are the subject of much open discussion with Japanese service officers who are required to eschew nearly all external related defence issues under Article 9 of their Constitution, which restricts them to their self-defence role. But the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (CDS equivalent) and other senior civilian officials (in particular Mr Arima (Director General North American Affairs Bureau and Japanese Representative on the UNC Joint Board) and Mr Nishihiro (Admin Vice Minister at Japanese Defence Agency)) acknowledged that, having tied themselves bilaterally to the US on defence matters for many years, they now have no separate national axis on which to develop their position on major international arms control issues and, in particular, the Gorbachev initiatives.
27.
With their 4 northern islands still illegally held and militarised by the USSR since 1945, I see no likely shift in official policy towards the USSR until they are handed back, but I detected some concern from Mr Arima that Japanese public opinion could eventually be wooed by Mr Gorbachev's new thinking despite the occupation of the Northern Territories. I also noted some concern at the higher levels that Japan may be failing to influence sufficiently directly the international arms control process which could, if successful in the West, actually allow the USSR to divert more military pressure onto Japan which is already faced by large Soviet forces outside the ATTU area.
F VVISREPS/1
7 of 10 SECRET UK EYES A
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