TNAG-1939-FCO40-2765-Future-of-Hong-Kong-defence-and-public-order-1989 — Page 19

SECRET UK EYES A

LOCSEN

could be affected, possibly resulting in resignations, desertions, absenteeism or lack of co-operation. This latter dimension could have a knock-on effect and inhibit reductions in Force levels or cause their reinstatement.

K

13. Chinese Intervention. There are thus a variety of factors which could leave to domestic unrest and violence in Hong Kong in the pattern of previous disturbances. These factors are difficult to predict. In addition, if civil disturbances spread and intensify beyond a manageable level, there is a possibility that the PRCG may act in accordance with their perceived right to restore stability should they judge HMG/HKG to lack either the capability or the will to do so.

14. DIS 1991 Study. In view of the above, the DIS should be tasked to produce an intelligence assessment detailing the factors likely to contribute to the outbreak of violence and what, if any, additional collection and assessment capability will be required to monitor the threat in order to achieve timely warning. The study should be completed by 1 July 1991 in time to be considered by the authors of the major 1991 review of the Garrison withdrawal plan discussed at paragraphs 42 and 43. This study should be linked to the overall intelligence study to be led by DGMSI and currently due to be produced by mid-1992 as indicated in the catalogue of studies (6) to be undertaken in support of the withdrawal plan. Subject to endorsement by the COS of the proposed major 1991 review, the overall DGMSI-led intelligence study is to be assigned a revised completion date of 1 July 1991.

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Note:

6.

D Cts Staff(R)/76/259/28 dated 21 August 1988.

COS53.4-15

8

LOCSEN

UK EYES A

SECRET