TNAG-1937-FCO40-2763-Future-of-Hong-Kong-defence-and-public-order-1989 — Page 47

CODE 18-77

A.

PJ Cartwright Esq

Defence Dept

SECRET UK EYES A

HKC062/1

Reference

Mr Masurh +PA

Masurna

79

OVERSEAS GARRISON REVIEW : BRUNEI

1.

L

24

Your minute of 17 February asked for SEAD's comments on the MOD draft paper.

2.

With respect to Brunei, the paper thoroughly reviews the reasons for maintaining the Garrison there, but fails to adequately address the issues raised by the progressive withdrawal from Hong Kong, and the future of the Brigade of Gurkhas generally. In order to take account of these important factors, I suggest the following changes to the draft paper:

(i) Para 5 line 1. After "Cyprus" add "and the team which operates the jungle warfare training facilities in Brunei".

*

After rebellion"

(ii) Para 18 line 7. Add led by the Parti Rakyat Brunei (PRB).

(iii) Para 20 line 1. First sentence should read: "There is no immediate external threat to Brunei."

(iv) Para 21 line 1. After the first sentence insert the additional sentence: "The disbandment of Brunei's two registered political parties during 1988 aroused little comment in a country where political apathy is considerable."

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11

(v) Para 21 line 8. Final sentence should read: "As the proportion of the Bruneian population who have been educated in the West increases, there is a future possibility of dissatisfaction against the, at present benevolent, but still totalitarian rule.

(vi) Para 25 Paragraph should read "The Sultan of Brunei has offered to accept into Brunei, units withdrawn from Hong Kong, under the same arrangements as those for the present battalion, at Brunei's expense. It is likely that this offer was made in a spirit of helpfulness rather than as a test of HMG's commitment to Brunei. The response to it awaits Ministerial decisions regarding the Brigade of Gurkhas. The only foreign policy reason favouring acceptance is that it could bring valuable commercial and financial spin-offs for the UK. However, an acceptance of the offer followed by the subsequent withdrawal of units from Brunei in the future, would create a worse impression than a courteous declination at the outset. This would particularly be the case if we committed extra units as from 1992, the date of the withdrawal of the first Battalion from Hong Kong, and then failed to renew the Agreement in 1993."

(vii) Para 29 Line 6 The final two sentences should read: "There seems little reason to study this subject further until agreement on the 1993-1998 extension has been achieved with the Sultan, although we must avoid giving the impression that further extensions are a foregone conclusion. In the meantime, there is

SECRET UK EYES A