TNAG-1909-FCO40-2713-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-voluntary-and-mandatory-repat-1989 — Page 153

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SECRET

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From: P J Weston

Date: 7 December 1989

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BUS him Semiting & Stand. I am grateful

VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE

1.

to your help. Bor 2/12

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When the Secretary of State called his meeting this morning I was on the point of putting to you certain views on this subject. For the record they are set out in the following paras. I also attach at Annex A the elements of a deal with the United States and at Annex B a game plan on how to proceed over the next two months. (These ideas will need discussion and elaboration by SEAD and HKD.)

2.

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The decision whether to proceed on the day must be a political judgement first and foremost. In practical terms, we must hope to engineer circumstances in which the repatriation of screened-out boat people becomes progressively easier; there seems to me, however, a real risk that the most likely outcome will be success in pushing through the first flight of 56 non-volunteers, but at such cost to HMG in public relations and in UK/US terms that further such flights become more difficult. This would be the worst of both worlds.

3.

The Americans are clearly raising the pressure. The warnings from Blackwill and Eagleburger not to proceed in the aftermath of Camp David, the US press campaign, the US Ambassador's demarche to Mr Maude, Sir A Acland's warning of "The gravest damage" to our wider interests and the arrival of Secretary Baker in London on 11 December, taken together, represent a formidable series of shots across our bows. HM Ambassador Hanoi has said that he sees "a very real risk of a debacle" if force is to be used at the Hanoi end. At the Hong Kong end, with the much greater exposure, the best laid plans may go awry. This potent mix of ingredients is surely only worth risking to secure a major prize or to avoid a major catastrophe.

4.

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Public tolerance in Hong Kong is a vital factor. There is without doubt political and public capital to be gained by instituting a programme of mandatory repatriation, and indeed the credibility of the Governor and his Government in handling this issue is now, to some extent, staked on doing so. attach a copy of Hong Kong telno 3950 which contains an assessment of the Legco view. But we have to ask whether the satisfaction of Legco and public opinion in Hong Kong is a sufficiently major prize; and whether it could be secured by a single, highly controversial repatriation exercise. For it is possible that we may be precluded from progressing to the next and subsequent involuntary flights.

In this event, the deterrent effect of the repatriation flight, and the possible inducement to others to volunteer

5.

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SECRET