TNAG-1909-FCO40-2713-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-voluntary-and-mandatory-repat-1989 — Page 148

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DSR 11C (Revised 5/87)

6 I am satisfied that everything possible has been done

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION to ensure the success of this difficult and sensitive

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

operation. But we must recognise that it cannot be made

totally risk free. We need to take a final decision

whether or not to proceed by noon on 11 December, just

before my lunch with Secretary Baker.

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

7 I also mentioned to you that we were looking beyond

the first operation on 12 December. We must face the

fact that even if we send back several more plane loads

of non volunteers in the coming months, it may not deter

a fresh outflow next year. An overriding priority must

be to prevent another influx into Hong Kong on the scale

of 1989, which amounted to over 30,000.

/

In my view, the most effective deterrent would be to

deal with new arrivals through rapid screening and the

quick return of those screened out. If this could be

done on board ship without the individuals setting foot

on Hong Kong soil, so much the better. However the

feasibility of such a scheme to a large degree depends on

the credibility of the screening arrangements and the

willingness of the Vietnamese to cooperate. I envisage a

difficult negotiation with both the UNHCR and the

Vietnamese about this. However, even the news that we

are working on such a scheme might have a deterrent

effect. There would certainly be a substantial price to

pay. I intend to put detailed proposals to you and

colleagues as soon as possible.

A copy of this minute goes to OD (K) colleagues.

SECRET