TNAG-1908-FCO40-2712-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-voluntary-and-mandatory-repat-1989 — Page 207

Mr Colvin, SEAD

CONFIDENTIAL

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PS/Mrs Chalker PS/Mr Waldegrave

PS/Mr Maude

PS/Lord Brabazon

PS/PUS

Mr Lankester

Mr Gillmore

Mr McLaren

Mr Paul HKD Head, News Dept Head, NAD

Special Advisers

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Vietnamese Boat People: Repatriation

The Secretary of State has considered your submission of 7 November. At the meeting we are holding on Tuesday 14 November at 1100 hrs to discuss Vietnamese boat people, the Secretary of State would like to consider the points he should discuss with the Prime Minister at their bilateral that afternoon. These include in particular:

monitoring: the Secretary of State thinks that we will need to have in place a monitoring agreement with UNHCR - or a reputable NGO - before we go ahead with repatriation;

the nature of the approach which the Prime Minister should make to President Bush when she sees him on 24 November. The Secretary of State thinks the Prime Minister will need to say to Bush "We have to go ahead unless you are prepared to do X and Y". The question is what should X and Y be? Possibilities would include:

a) that the international community must, exceptionally, agree to treat the boat people now in Hong Kong as refugees and accept them for international settlement. That would involve the US playing a full part. (Question: would we have to play our full part too?

And,

if so, to the tune of how many people?)

b) an international agreement that, in future, boat people reaching Hong Kong should be automatically turned around and sent back to Vietnam. (Question: to achieve that, would we need an international aid package to Vietnam to get them to discourage people from leaving in the first place and to accept them back if they did leave?)

The Secretary of State will also want to consider at the meeting whether, if we go ahead with repatriation, we should do so on 2-3 December as proposed in your submission, or after SC3. Much will depend on whether we can formulate an approach to President Bush on the lines outlined above and, obviously, on his response. In the meantime, the draft telegram attached to your submission should NOT issue.

Lillian

(J S Wall)

10 November 1989

CONFIDENTIAL