TNAG-1877-FCO40-2668-Student-demonstrations-and-internal-political-situation-in-C-1989 — Page 86

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130430

MDHIAN 6469

HKB 020/14

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PEKING

TO DESKBY 25080OZF CO

TELNO 945

OF 25023OZ MAY 89

INFO DESKBY 25040OZ HONG KONG

INFO IMMEDIATE SEOUL, TOKYO

стого

PERSONAL FOR PAUL, H K D.

HONG KONG PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR.

SEOUL PLEASE PASS TO LORD GLENARTHUR.

TOKYO PLEASE PASS TO PU S, VISITING.

7

HONG KONG TELNO 1698 TO F C O.

CHINA INTERNAL SITUATION: PM'S QUESTION TIME.

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·

A COMMENT ON THE SITUATION BY THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE

AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL STEP. BEFORE WE RECOMMEND IT WE SHOULD,

I THINK, GET THE FOLLOWING POINTS CLEAR IN OUR MINDS:

2.

A WIDE RANGE OF ''BAD'' OUTCOMES ARE STILL POSSIBLE IN

CHINA, STARTING WITH THE CONSOLIDATION OF A MORE HARD LINE GOVERNMENT (BUT WITHOUT BLOODSHED OR LOSS OF FORMAL

CONTINUITY) AND RANGING UP TO MORE DRAMATIC AND/OR VIOLENT

OUTCOMES:

UNDER ALL THESE SCENARIOS EXCEPT THE MOST VIOLENT ONES, OUR POLICY WOULD HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND FROM THE OUTSET THE NEED FOR DAMAGE LIMITATION BOTH IN THE HONG KONG AND TO THE EXTENT RELEVANT AND APPROPRIATE) THE BILATERAL CONTEXT:

SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT (NOT) WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE JD HAD BEEN INVALIDATED OR THAT IT COULD NO LONGER OFFER HONG KONG ANY PROTECTION. WE WOULD PRESUMABLY ALSO WISH TO LIMIT RATHER THAN AGGRAVATE THE INEVITABLE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG, FOR GOOD ECONOMIC AS WELL AS POLITICAL REASONS.

THE LINE PROPOSED IN PARA 2 OF TUR SEEMS TO ME WELL JUDGED FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW. SINCE IT AVOIDS DEFINING THE POLITICAL OUTCOME WE WANT TO SEE IN CHINA (ALTHOUGH THIS IS CLEAR ENOUGH, AS IT SHOULD BE, BY IMPLICATION), IT STOPS SHORT OF LEADING US

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CONFIDENTIAL