CONFIDENTIAL
130430
MDHIAN 6469
HKB 020/14
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PEKING
TO DESKBY 25080OZF CO
TELNO 945
OF 25023OZ MAY 89
INFO DESKBY 25040OZ HONG KONG
INFO IMMEDIATE SEOUL, TOKYO
стого
PERSONAL FOR PAUL, H K D.
HONG KONG PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR.
SEOUL PLEASE PASS TO LORD GLENARTHUR.
TOKYO PLEASE PASS TO PU S, VISITING.
7
HONG KONG TELNO 1698 TO F C O.
CHINA INTERNAL SITUATION: PM'S QUESTION TIME.
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·
A COMMENT ON THE SITUATION BY THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE
AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL STEP. BEFORE WE RECOMMEND IT WE SHOULD,
I THINK, GET THE FOLLOWING POINTS CLEAR IN OUR MINDS:
2.
A WIDE RANGE OF ''BAD'' OUTCOMES ARE STILL POSSIBLE IN
CHINA, STARTING WITH THE CONSOLIDATION OF A MORE HARD LINE GOVERNMENT (BUT WITHOUT BLOODSHED OR LOSS OF FORMAL
CONTINUITY) AND RANGING UP TO MORE DRAMATIC AND/OR VIOLENT
OUTCOMES:
UNDER ALL THESE SCENARIOS EXCEPT THE MOST VIOLENT ONES, OUR POLICY WOULD HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND FROM THE OUTSET THE NEED FOR DAMAGE LIMITATION BOTH IN THE HONG KONG AND TO THE EXTENT RELEVANT AND APPROPRIATE) THE BILATERAL CONTEXT:
SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT (NOT) WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE JD HAD BEEN INVALIDATED OR THAT IT COULD NO LONGER OFFER HONG KONG ANY PROTECTION. WE WOULD PRESUMABLY ALSO WISH TO LIMIT RATHER THAN AGGRAVATE THE INEVITABLE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG, FOR GOOD ECONOMIC AS WELL AS POLITICAL REASONS.
THE LINE PROPOSED IN PARA 2 OF TUR SEEMS TO ME WELL JUDGED FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW. SINCE IT AVOIDS DEFINING THE POLITICAL OUTCOME WE WANT TO SEE IN CHINA (ALTHOUGH THIS IS CLEAR ENOUGH, AS IT SHOULD BE, BY IMPLICATION), IT STOPS SHORT OF LEADING US
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CONFIDENTIAL