TNAG-1872-FCO40-2660-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-China-1989 — Page 129

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its principal proponent and symbol.

There was a general

air of uncertainty and of reluctance to take or even to

face up to major decisions.

3.

The Congress did little to dispel this. In his

rather lacklustre review of domestic and international

policy, Premier Li Peng reiterated the more cautious policies for dealing with China's economic ills, which he

apparently favours. Inflation was identified as the main

problem and the Chinese people were warned of a period of

two or three years austerity while the economy is brought

under control. No new approach was outlined and further significant reform of the economic system was put off.

There was little sign at the Congress of the underlying

debate within the leadership on the direction and speed

of economic reform. Rather agreement was reached on

short-term, essentially pragmatic measures to deal with

the current problems.

4.

Nor was there much progress on political reform. Over the last few years the National People's Congress has been becoming a more assertive body and less of a

simple rubber stamp to Party policy. But no new ground was broken this time, and discussion was less lively than

last year.

Delegates did, however, voice some telling criticisms of government performance, reflecting popular

concerns. These did not include the dissident issue

(despite earlier expectations and the efforts of some

groups and individuals from Hong Kong). In his report Li Peng accepted collective responsibility on behalf of the

leadership for past errors. While some of what he said

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