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CONFIDENTIAL
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participants to go back and demonstrate their toughness to public opinion, particularly in areas where they had failed to secure a particular objective. This is what Gorbachev was now doing. Ridgway said that the interesting question was who advised Gorbachev to revert to the stale detente language in the final round of talks with the President. All the advisers with whom she had dealt had, she thought, understood the US point that such reversion would discredit everything which had been achieved by Gorbachev's policies and hark back to the Brezhnev doctrine. The acceptable language which she had finally negotiated had even been cleared with Gorbachev. Yet the old language was trotted out again at the last meeting with the President. She did not think Shevardnadze responsible, since he had not remained in the negotiations. reminiscent of the Gromyko approach.
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The Secretary of State congratulated Shultz on the achievements of the Summit and the painstaking way in which he had pursued the relationship with the Soviet Union. There were bound to be peaks and troughs in the relationship and he expected some form of hiatus now after the Summit. Shultz agreed that this would indeed be the case. The Geneva negotiations would not resume until 12 July. No meetings were scheduled with Shevardnadze in July. August would be dominated by the Republican Convention and by vacations. This took the timetable to September. He thought that he would next meet Shevardnadze in Washington just in advance of the UNGA. Although US-Soviet relations would "go off track for a while", his prime objective was to create and leave a structure which the incoming US Administration could pursue. The next major stage in the relation- ship would be to move away from arms control to regional and human rights issues.
ANOTHER REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT: START, INF
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He thought that Gorbachev would be amenable to another Summit provided there was a real reason. However, he could not see the START Treaty being completed this year. The Senate was "scared to death" of it and did not want to face up to the issues it posed. would actually prefer it if the Senate were made to focus on a START Treaty: it would keep them out of other mischief in the pre-election period. There would only be progress if the Senate developed a sense of involvement.
4. Congressional consideration of the INF Treaty had caused the State Department major work. He had had to set up a separate organisation to handle it. There had been 70 appearances before Senate and Congressional committees, 3 by him. The State Department had also answered 1300 separate questions. The INF Treaty was a solid piece of work and had been virtually unassailable on the Hill. The process had been greatly facilitated by of the solidity of Allied support.
The French Defence Minister's reference to the Treaty being another Munich had been quickly overcome.
CONFIDENTIAL
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