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confidential discussion between the Five might provide some insurance. Other ASEAN nations (eg the Thais) believed that it would assist the inter-factional and regional processes.
6.
M Dufourcq said that we should await the outcome of the
5 November meeting. Sir J Fretwell agreed but hoped that discreet discussions among the Five could proceed and
reinforce pressure on the parties to find a solution.
Mr Colvin observed that Vietnam was not in a strong position
to object to UN involvement or exert a veto over it. They
wanted Western help and to rejoin the international community. Their economy was a shambles. That was why they had been prepared to negotiate over repatriating Hong Kong boat people.
7.
Sir John Fretwell asked if the French believed
the Vietnamese really intended to withdraw. M Dufourcq had
seen no signs to the contrary. He believed about 20,000
Vietnamese troops had already been withdrawn. Mr Colvin believed the true figure was significantly lower. Sir John Fretwell said that some "withdrawals" might have been troop rotations. But nonetheless the Vietnamese policy appeared serious. M Dufourcq agreed that the Vietnamese economic
situation was serious: Western help was needed: withdrawal
was therefore seen to be necessary. The economic card was
strong; the question was when and how it should be played.
But the time for this had not yet come.
8. Sir John Fretwell said that the USSR had used their
influence on the Vietnamese in order to remove one of the
obstacles to normalising Sino-Soviet relations. However, he
was unsure of the Chinese response and longer term
intentions. M Dufourcq commented that Deng Xiaoping's
position was unclear ("flou artistique"). He wanted to
retain the Summit card in order to maintain pressure on the
USSR. Mr Colvin said that the Chinese seemed ready to drop
Pol Pot. A coalition government of all four factions seemed the best option. If the Khmer Rouge were marginalised, they
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