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premature to use the Five to seek to establish the timing of participation in an international conference. It might be
useful to do so later but they did not want a repetition of
experience over Afghanistan. The next step was the
Sihanouk/Hun Sen talks. Son San might attend; it was far from sure that the Khmer Rouge would do so. The position
could be reviewed after that.
3. Mr Colvin said that the French seemed to see our
proposal as calling for formal activity by the Permanent
Five. But we were not suggesting a formal or
institutionalised role. If Cambodia remained on the
informal agenda the Five would be ready to react if and when necessary, particularly if, as the French envisaged, an international conference became a possibility. Meanwhile
informal discussion could usefully identify common ground and objectives and assist the peace process. The major recent development had in fact been the Sino-Soviet rapprochement which was not part of the inter-factional or regional processes. So outside influences were important.
4.
M Dufourcq said that it was now important for Vietnam
to become accustomed to international participation and
their hostility to UN involvement lessened. Sir J Fretwell had seen signs of the USSR and the Chinese pressing Vietnam
and the Khmer Rouge respectively behind the scenes.
M Dufourcq queried how effective this pressure was. The
Soviet base at Camh Ran was important. Mr Colvin commented
that the message of Gorbachev's speech at Krasnoyarsk had
been directed at the Vietnamese and that this base was not
indispensible. M Dufourcq agreed but wondered if the
message was credible.
5. Mr Colvin identified two problems: to secure Vietnamese
withdrawal (where there was still a long way to go) and to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge. The French placed their faith in the inter-factional and regional processes.
But if these failed to deliver, what then? Informal and
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