TNAG-1788-FCO40-2548-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-general-1988 — Page 181

A

B

C

A

E

leaving it vacant).

Background and Argument

3.

The Private Secretary's minute of 30 August requested views, in good time before UNGA, on when and how to move the Cambodian peace process forward. My submission of 20 July recommended a more active British role, granted that we are not a leading player, our direct interests are limited and

The we need to stay close to major allies and partners. Secretary of State's meeting on 22 July broadly endorsed this approach, but having severe regard to the limitations of our resources (notably on peace keeping) and reordering British priorities as follows:

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

to help resolve the Hong Kong boat people problem;

to consolidate our links with ASEAN;

to reinforce our effectiveness at the United Nations;

to avoid identification with support for the Khmer Rouge.

The Timetable

4.

Since that meeting, diplomatic activity has

continued:

(a)

(b)

(c)

there was no breakthrough at the JIM (25-28 July) but a working group to examine specific aspects of a political solution is to report by December 1988 with a view to a second JIM;

on 26 July, Mr McLaren had a bilateral meeting with

The M. Claude Martin, French Asian Director. Secretary of State was encouraged that the French, like us, do not see a major role for the Twelve. This leaves the United Nations as the main diplomatic theatre;

on 7 August, the Prime Minister met Prince Sihanouk at Site B, and made a speech. On 8 August in Bangkok, she publicly suggested that the five UNSC Permanent Members "be asked to take a close interest in promoting a settlement to the Cambodian problem... the aim should be to secure the withdrawal of the Vietnamese and then a political settlement which gives Cambodia a stable and secure government.";

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