TNAG-1776-FCO40-2530-Daya-Bay-nuclear-power-station-project-safety-concerns-in-Ho-1988 — Page 120

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(xi)

The introduction of countermeasures should achieve

a net positive benefit. They should not be introduced to avoid trivial doses that may be associated with minor releases. Guidance on when

particular countermeasures should be introduced is

given. [Chapter 10, paragraph 10.1, page 70]

(xii) Any significant incident at the Daya Bay nuclear

plant would require the population to be provided with timely and accurate information on the incident and what actions, if any, they should

take. The Government Information Services

Department is already equipped to take the lead on

this in collaboration with the Civil Control

Centre.

(xiii)

(xiv)

[Chapter 11, page 73]

Because of the remoteness of the possibility of a major release seriously affecting Hong Kong, provision of all but essential equipment needed

during the first few days of an incident should be

unnecessary. Consideration should be given to the

sources of expertise and equipment which might be

called on during the intermediate and recovery

phases through organisation such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. [Chapter 12,

paragraph 12.15, page 83]

A Radiological Protection Advisory Group should be

established to provide independent advice on the

risks associated with the possible accident at Daya Bay and to keep a watching brief on international developments on Emergency Reference Levels, Derived Emergency Reference Levels and the optimisation of radiological protection. [Chapter 12, paragraph 12.18, page 84]

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