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(xi)
The introduction of countermeasures should achieve
a net positive benefit. They should not be introduced to avoid trivial doses that may be associated with minor releases. Guidance on when
particular countermeasures should be introduced is
given. [Chapter 10, paragraph 10.1, page 70]
(xii) Any significant incident at the Daya Bay nuclear
plant would require the population to be provided with timely and accurate information on the incident and what actions, if any, they should
take. The Government Information Services
Department is already equipped to take the lead on
this in collaboration with the Civil Control
Centre.
(xiii)
(xiv)
[Chapter 11, page 73]
Because of the remoteness of the possibility of a major release seriously affecting Hong Kong, provision of all but essential equipment needed
during the first few days of an incident should be
unnecessary. Consideration should be given to the
sources of expertise and equipment which might be
called on during the intermediate and recovery
phases through organisation such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. [Chapter 12,
paragraph 12.15, page 83]
A Radiological Protection Advisory Group should be
established to provide independent advice on the
risks associated with the possible accident at Daya Bay and to keep a watching brief on international developments on Emergency Reference Levels, Derived Emergency Reference Levels and the optimisation of radiological protection. [Chapter 12, paragraph 12.18, page 84]
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