TNAG-1658-FCO40-2306-Daya-Bay-nuclear-power-station-project-safety-concerns-in-Ho-1987 — Page 253

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It should be mentioned also that international discussions are

taking place regarding additional technical measures that could be taken

on presently operating nuclear power reactors to further reduce the risk

of accidents or their effects, for instance, filter-venting to allow the

release of overpressures without releasing radioactivity. Studies are

also being made for new types of reactors which could offer more inherent

safety than the present ones do.

i

I shall not tire you by describing a number of other measures which

are being taken, for instance concerning international incident reporting

and analysis to enable States to learn from one another. Safety is not a

static concept. Whether we are concerned with cars, aeroplanes or

nuclear power stations, safety can always be strengthened.

I turn now to the non-proliferation issue. When the IAEA was

established 30 years ago, it was authorized to set up a safeguards system

with on-site inspection to assure that any assistance it provided would

not be used for military purposes. This safeguards system is now a

fundamental element in the present non-proliferation régime. Governments

understandably attach great importance to assurances that hardware, fuel

or nuclear technology which they sell does not promote proliferation of

nuclear weapons. Against this background, non-proliferation conditions

in bilateral supply agreements have been made stricter. The cornerstone

of the non-proliferation régime still remains the Non-Proliferation

Treaty. It is complemented by the treaties on nuclear-weapons-free

zones, notably the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty and the recently

concluded Rarotonga Treaty in the South Pacific.