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It should be mentioned also that international discussions are
taking place regarding additional technical measures that could be taken
on presently operating nuclear power reactors to further reduce the risk
of accidents or their effects, for instance, filter-venting to allow the
release of overpressures without releasing radioactivity. Studies are
also being made for new types of reactors which could offer more inherent
safety than the present ones do.
i
I shall not tire you by describing a number of other measures which
are being taken, for instance concerning international incident reporting
and analysis to enable States to learn from one another. Safety is not a
static concept. Whether we are concerned with cars, aeroplanes or
nuclear power stations, safety can always be strengthened.
I turn now to the non-proliferation issue. When the IAEA was
established 30 years ago, it was authorized to set up a safeguards system
with on-site inspection to assure that any assistance it provided would
not be used for military purposes. This safeguards system is now a
fundamental element in the present non-proliferation régime. Governments
understandably attach great importance to assurances that hardware, fuel
or nuclear technology which they sell does not promote proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Against this background, non-proliferation conditions
in bilateral supply agreements have been made stricter. The cornerstone
of the non-proliferation régime still remains the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. It is complemented by the treaties on nuclear-weapons-free
zones, notably the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty and the recently
concluded Rarotonga Treaty in the South Pacific.