TNAG-1657-FCO40-2305-Daya-Bay-nuclear-power-station-project-safety-concerns-in-Ho-1987 — Page 143

CONFIDENTIAL

SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY (SPNFZT)

Problem

1.

Our policy towards signature of the SPNFZT Protocols

in the light of a US announcement shortly that they will

not sign them, and of the Soviet declaration on it

signature of all three Protocals?

Recommendation

2.

I recommend that we should announce that:-

(a) the UK has decided not to sign the Protocols; but

(b) it will continue to respect the undertakings in

Protocol I not to test, manufacture or station nuclear

explosive devices on Pitcairn (the territory for which we

have responsibility in the SPNFZ area); we would reaffirm

our customary NSA formula (negative security assurance

undertaking not to use/threaten to use nuclear weapons)

to States Parties to the SPNFZT, not the unacceptable

formula contained in Protocol II which offers assurances

of no first use; (and) that we have no intention to test in

the South Pacific in respect of Protocol III

(c) Our policy towards signature of the Protocols will

be kept under review;

(d) we would be prepared to reconsider our position in

the light inter alia of to which

and the Soviet declaration as to whether transit of

the ambiguities in the SPNFZT to riided,

nuclear weapons/ships/aircraft visits are permissible

under the Treaty being subject to satisfactory

S

claraification; (ii) signature of the Treaty and

CONFIDENTIAL

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