CONFIDENTIAL
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY (SPNFZT)
Problem
1.
Our policy towards signature of the SPNFZT Protocols
in the light of a US announcement shortly that they will
not sign them, and of the Soviet declaration on it
signature of all three Protocals?
Recommendation
2.
I recommend that we should announce that:-
(a) the UK has decided not to sign the Protocols; but
(b) it will continue to respect the undertakings in
Protocol I not to test, manufacture or station nuclear
explosive devices on Pitcairn (the territory for which we
have responsibility in the SPNFZ area); we would reaffirm
our customary NSA formula (negative security assurance
undertaking not to use/threaten to use nuclear weapons)
to States Parties to the SPNFZT, not the unacceptable
formula contained in Protocol II which offers assurances
of no first use; (and) that we have no intention to test in
the South Pacific in respect of Protocol III
(c) Our policy towards signature of the Protocols will
be kept under review;
(d) we would be prepared to reconsider our position in
the light inter alia of to which
and the Soviet declaration as to whether transit of
the ambiguities in the SPNFZT to riided,
nuclear weapons/ships/aircraft visits are permissible
under the Treaty being subject to satisfactory
S
claraification; (ii) signature of the Treaty and
CONFIDENTIAL
INSE NEW LINE