TNAG-1638-FCO40-2282-Future-of-Hong-Kong-withdrawal-of-the-British-garrison-1987 — Page 94

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

LOCSEN

SECRET UK EYES A

such, the role of the force whatever its eventual size - would still require it to maintain the capability to act in

support of the HKG, 1.e. MACA and MACP roles for which British

-

troops are prepared wherever they serve. The force must not only possess the capability, there must be no doubt about its

commitment and effectiveness. Furthermore, in the event of serious IS unrest, there may be a need for HMG to demonstrate sovereignty. In this context, it may be necessary to underline HMG's resolve by deploying the force on to the border to deter Chinese interference.

43. Operational Deployment.

a.

In the 'worst case scenario', the 2+1 force would provide the flexibility of 2 deployment options:

(1)

Traditional IS Option. In the traditional IS

Police Force support role, 2 battalions could deploy to Hong Kong Island and Kowloon respectively. The third 'Brunei' battalion could deploy to the New

Territories or remain in reserve in Kowloon.

(2) Consolidated Option. In the consolidated option,

one battalion could deploy to the border to relieve

the PTU for IS duties. A second battalion could

deploy to safeguard Kai Tak airport, other reinforcement

assets, the seat of Government and vital communications

links, thereby releasing more Police. The third

battalion could deploy as an IS reserve.

b. In the event of the Sovereign Force being reduced to

one resident battalion group the feasibility of these options in the face of a threat warranting military

involvement would be reduced. Should the Brunei battalion

not be available, the risks inherent in a single battalion group deployment would be increased still further.

21

UK EYES A

SECRET

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