(11) WE MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS NO CLEAR CONSENSUS, AND THAT THEREFORE NO DIRECTLY ELECTED ELEMENT SHOULD BE INTRODUCED IN 1988, WITH THE QUESTION BEING REVIEWED AGAIN AT A LATER DATE (SAY 1990). THE CHINESE WOULD ALSO BE CONTENT WITH THIS. ONCE AGAIN, HOWEVER, WHETHER SUCH A LINE WOULD BE POLITICALLY TENABLE IN HONG KONG WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER THIS ASSESSMENT WAS WIDELY SHARED. AT THE VERY LEAST THERE WOULD BE FIERCE CRITICISM FROM THE PRO-DIRECT ELECTION LOBBY THAT WE HAD AVOIDED THE ISSUE AND FAILED TO RESPOND TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF HONG KONG PEOPLE AND STAND
UP TO CHINESE.
(111) WE MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT A MAJORITY OF HONG KONG PEOPLE FAVOURED DIRECT ELECTIONS IN PRINCIPLE, BUT THAT IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING DIVISION OF OPINION ON WHETHER THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT IT WOULD BE BEST IF THEY WERE NOT INTRODUCED IN 1988. WE MIGHT SET A FUTURE DATE FOR THEIR INTRODUCTION OR LEAVE THIS FOR SUBSEQUENT DECISION. SUCH AN OUTCOME (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) MIGHT, DEPENDING ON THE BALANCE AND STRENGTH OF OPINIONS EXPRESSED, BE POLITICALLY TENABLE IN HONG KONG, GIVEN THE TENDENCY OF THE HONG KONG PEOPLE TO SEEK COMPROMISE AND AVOID CONFRONTATION. BUT THERE ARE CLEARLY THE SAME DANGERS TO THE CREDIBILITY AND AUTHORITY OF HMG AND THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT. THE PROSPECT OF A DIRECT CLASH WITH THE CHINESE WOULD BE REDUCED. IT WOULD STILL BE NECESSARY TO ORCHESTRATE WITH THEM, IN ADVANCE, SOME FORM OF PARALLEL CONCLUSIONS WITHIN THE BLDC SO AS TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE FORCING ITS HAND.
(IV) WE MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT HONG KONG OPINION CLEARLY FAVOURED THE INTRODUCTION IN 1988 OF A SMALL DIRECTLY ELECTED ELEMENT IN LEGCO. IN THAT CASE WE WOULD HAVE TO PERSUADE THE CHINESE TO GO ALONG WITH SUCH A CONCLUSION IN THE WHITE PAPER ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ALL SUBSEQUENT CHANGES WOULD FALL WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF
THE BASIC LAW AND WITH A STATEMENT OF INTENT WHICH WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT POST-1997 ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE ENVISAGED FOR LEGCO IN 1988. IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT SUCH
AN OUTCOME COULD BE ACHIEVED, BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. IT IS LIKELY THAT PERSONAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND WU XUEQIAN WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SECURE IT.
26.
IT IS (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) RECOMMENDED THAT WE ADOPT THE QUOTE LIMITED DELAY UNQUOTE OPTION FOR THE TIMING OF THE
REVIEW, AND AIM TO PUBLISH THE GREEN PAPER AT THE LATEST AT THE
END OF MAY 1987, AND THE WHITE PAPER IN JANUARY 1988 (PARA 15 ABOVE).
IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT WE PREPARE THE WAY FOR THE REVIEW BY
UNDETAKING THE SERIES OF CONTACTS WITH THE CHINESE LISTED IN PARA. 20 ABOVE, AND THAT WE HANDLE THE GREEN PAPER WITH THE CHINESE
ON THE BASIS OF PARA. 22 ABOVE. AT THIS STAGE, MINISTERS ARE
REQUESTED ONLY TO NOTE THE POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR THE OUTCOME OF
THE REVIEW DESCRIBED IN PARA, 25 ABOVE.
27.
A CONSOLIDATED TIMETABLE OF EVENTS IN 1987, ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT THIS OPTION WAS ADOPTED, IS ANNEXED.
THONG
ANNEX
8 SECRET
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