OUTH AFRICA
1
CONFIDENT
3.
M. Bariani said that, while there was universal condemnation
of apartheid, this did not exclude reflection on modalities of dealing with South Africa. It was open to question whether keeping the French Ambassador in Paris and rejecting entirely South Africa,
which could weaken Mr Botha's position vis-à-vis his extremists, was the best approach. French policy might be redefined in the coming
months.
4. Mrs Chalker stressed the importance of the Eminent Persons
Group. The South African Government would shortly respond to the Group's proposals. There was some acceptance of the need for rapprochment, but more time and careful handling were required. The
risks of bloodshed in South Africa and the danger to front-line
states were very worrying. Further indiscriminate sanctions would
not work: their main effect would be to damage the interests of the
black population and South Africa's neighbours.
5. Mrs Chalker hoped that France and Britain could cooperate closely in the UN Security Council. The Soviet Union and their. friends were eager to embarrass the West.
6.
Mrs Chalker said that Britain would not attend the World
Sanctions Conference in Paris in June even as an observer. Western
participation would give the impression that we were willing to circumvent the Security Council. She hoped that France would not be involved. M. Gérard said that France's position was not yet fixed:
there was to be discussion among the Twelve.
NAMIBIA/ANGOLA
7. Mrs Chalker explained British views on Namibia and Angola and
asked for French comments. Mr Bariani was not briefed but he noted that countries such as Botswana and Mozambique had inconsistent views on South Africa. He was concerned about Zimbabwe where white
reserved seats were being abolished.
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CONDIDEMMTAT
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