TNAG-1535-FCO40-2099-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-repatriation-1986 — Page 41

DSR 11C

CONFIDENTIAL

at least programmes of assistance to resettle

returnees and possibly higher diplomatic prices

(recognition of PRK?) as a quid pro quo.

(iii) The return of people, some of whom had been

prepared to run the risks of murder, rape and ship-

wreck, to the conditions of life and control of

authorities from which they sought to escape would

be likely to provoke public and parliamentary

outcry at home or abroad.

(iv) It would be simple for hostile propagandists in

the Communist and Third Worlds to depict such

policies as inhumane and racist.

(v) It would be difficult to be sure that the policy

would command the support of the UN bodies

involved.

(vi) If Thailand attempted to return the displaced

Cambodians at this time, the likely results would

be to remove the basic support of the non-

Communist resistance. Khmer Rouge resistance

(probably) with Chinese support, could be strong

enough to destabilise Thailand.

(vii) The numbers involved would ensure prolonged press

and public attention greater than might be

expected for expulsion or repatriation of

individuals.

CONFIDENTIAL