TNAG-1534-FCO40-2098-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-repatriation-1986 — Page 80

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resettled). We remain under considerable Parliamentary and

public pressure to close down the closed camps. If the current fall in their population were to be reversed this would be seized upon as evidence of a callous attitude on

the part of HMG. A decline in the pace of resettlement

would increase the sense of frustration and thus the

possibility of further disturbances in the camps. The Hong Kong Government's plans progressively to close

less satisfactory camps as the refugee population fell

would have to be reconsidered.

down the

13.

Finally one implication of a lower level of departures

would be that the remaining resettlement programmes would

tend to concentrate more exclusively on those refugees who

were easiest to resettle. This would make more obvious and

more acute the plight of the "hard to resettle" refugees in

the open camps (estimated by Hong Kong in January at about

1,500).

Options for future action

14.

In his submission of 16 April 1985 with its

accompanying paper Mr Galsworthy considered a range of possible options aimed at resolving Hong Kong's refugee problem. These options were:

(a) to reduce the rate of arrivals by

(i) towing newly-arriving boats out to sea;

(ii) involuntary repatriation to Vietnam;

(iii) screening of new arrivals to segregate

"economic migrants" from genuine refugees,

to identify the former for

repatriation to Vietnam.

eventual

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