TNAG-1501-FCO40-2059-Guangdong-nuclear-power-station-project-at-Daya-Bay-safety-c-1986 — Page 114

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Reference....

Mr Calder

Mr Alty, SEE3, DTI

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Mr Cruickshank, OT2/3, DTI FED, FCO

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Mr Seaton, 'BTC Hong Kong

1.

I had lunch on 31 July with Mike Abrahams and Bob Wrathwell of GEC TG. The following points were discussed.

(a) Daya Bay

GEC TG are well aware of the nuclear safety problem. Their advisor, Mark Wong, believes that the UK should do more to assist Li Peng over this issue. In principle, he thinks that the HKG should bring out an internationally recognised nuclear expert to put the positive case for Daya Bay (to counteract the influence of

Mr Patterson who is employed by Friends of the Earth-type organisations). Wong believes that the Hong Kong public could be much reassured because they respect international experts. Wong also gives credence to the stories of a rift in the Chinese leadership. He bases this on the fact that even the left wing press in Hong Kong who took their lead from the Party propaganda organisations have been opposing Daya Bay. This indicates that Li Peng faces powerful opposition in Peking.

He was

Abrahams showed knowledge of the suggestion that signatures of the contracts might be delayed until Umelco had reported back. reasonably relaxed about this because he felt that the current time table of a signature ceremony in Peking in the second or third week of September could slip. The important date which should not be allowed to slip was 8 October when "authority to proceed" was scheduled for issue. If ATP itself slipped from October this could have repercussions down the line.

(b) HIPDC

He

Abrahams confirmed that HIPDC wished GEC to bid for Yueyang. had told HIPDC that they required DTI permission to bid but would do so if this were forthcoming. (We ran over the ground and agreed that DTI were now more likely to accept competitive tendering.) He said that the message received during his recent visit was that HIPDC and other Chinese bodies felt more comfortable with GEC whom they knew better than NEI. He felt that GEC now had to respond, though they could, if necessary, shelter behind a prohibition from DTI.

(c) UDI

Abrahams, feeling his way rather carefully, indicated that their information was that Eisenberg's contacts in MOFERT were under investigation. He also understood that Eisenberg was running down his stagg numbers in Peking. If these two points were true (I said we had no corroboration but that Vice Minister Wei Yuming had left MOFERT), this could explain why UDI were no longer favoured.

(d)...