SECRET
B
assessment
At the end of last week the Governor's (Hong Kong telno 2132) was that with few exceptions earlier support for Hong Kong involvement in the project had turned to opposition. He expressed the view that after the LegCo
debate on the
the adjournment scheduled for 16 July we should be fortunate to get through the present Legco session without a further debate, on the motion expressing the view that the Chinese Government should be asked to move the plant (or, presumably, to convert it to a thermal station).
possibly
6. On 4 July, however, UMELCO decided to mount their own independent investigation
the safety aspects of
am seeking (although I
.
power.
into
I assume
the
nuclear Governor's confirmation of this point) that the possibility
therefore) of an early hostile motion in Legco has receded
7.
the
Preventon was
terable
It would be as well, however, to consider what some of implications would be if, sooner or later, such a
to be
be tabled and adopted in LegCo. It would
and ourselves
ourselves with a
with a very face the
the Hong Kong Govenment and difficult prospect. The Governor would be likely to argue strongly that the only tangible position for the HKG would be for official members of LegCo to associate themselves with such a motion. Whatever the exact position adopted by officials, the implications of the motion for UK/Hong Kong relations would be serious. Unless, we were seen to be ready to act in Hong Kong's
in Hong Kong's interests, we could face the charge that we were disregarding the fears of the Hong · Kong people, motivated only by concerns of commercial gain our desire to maintain good relations with China.
!
8. At present this is no more than a hypothesis, and I do
think that it need be
not
Secretary of
State's minute.
directly addressed in the
Howe HMG would have
to
so
respond in such circumstances is difficult to predict
far ahead. But the minimum needed for HMG to demonstrate
SECRET
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.