TNAG-1461-FCO40-1987-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-Hong-Kong--Gibraltar-and-1986 — Page 96

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their assistance will remain primarily economic. The French and the Dutch (given their own colonial interests), might also be approached for increased assistance but are unlikely to show much interest if the UK was seen to be moving out of the region.

Other individual Caribbean states such as Jamaica, Trinadad, Barbados/ the Bahamas, or collectives such as the Caribbean Community and the Organisation of American States would also be unlikely to contribute much militarily. From the security point view the key to any successful disengagement would therefore rest

on an increased US role.

cond

21 The US already has a close interest, for defence, narcotics

and other reasons, in the future of these dependencies.

But up

to now it has suited the US that we have been locked into a

continuing security role in the region. That state of affairs

will continue so long as dependent status lasts. Indeed the US

could always increase the pressure on us to take steps to protect

US/Western interests in the dependencies. The US will not be

easily convinced of the need to assume greater responsibility in the affairs of these dependencies. They would need to be assured

that their failure to fill the gap left by a partial, or total,

UK withdrawal from the region would upset the balance of

interests in the area. Disengagement without US collaboration,

and without an understanding on future US responsibilities to the ex-dependencies, would however be detrimental to US interests and to our relationship with them. It is an open question whether such an understanding need be formalised on paper. On one view it might be thought that the Grenada operation already provides

an example of the US unwritten "guarantee" to small independent states in the region, though not one that would necessarily be

welcomed by all such states. But a more formal understanding,

perhaps as a means of limiting the scope for US intervention, might be more acceptable to the dependencies themselves.

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There are certain security dangers in any transition period.

Dependent status, so long as it is seen to be supported by the mass of the population, and while the UK guarantee remains

credible, attracts investors, increases the assurance of

stability and helps deter external threat. The "British" label

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