TNAG-1461-FCO40-1987-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-Hong-Kong--Gibraltar-and-1986 — Page 8

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CONFIDENTIAL

them can be assumed in the longer term to be immune from

outside aggression, internal subversion, the consequences of

organised crime or inadvertent involvement in regional

disputes. It is true that the Grenada episode demonstrated

that the mere fact of independence does not preclude small states from making political and security demands on larger states. But in the case of independent territories, far

less of the responsibility falls on HMG which has then

choices open to it.

2.1.2

Cost. Costs have in the past been modest, but this may change (see Section IV below). International

standards, expectations and the demands of internal security are rising, and these in turn could lead to increased

demands on the public purse for sophisticated infrastructure expenditure. So far the cost to HMG of providing and maintaining roads, telecommunications, airports etc has not increased markedly. The few examples of HMG having to spend significant sums to provide the facilities necessary to attract private investment (such as the £6m airport in the Turks and Caicos) may however provide a pointer to the

future.

2.2 Changes Since 1973 Going Against Withdrawal

2.2.1

Strategic Aspects. The US has invested heavily in new defence facilities on some of the dependent territories (BIOT in particular). It would not welcome any change of status that put access to its defence facilities at risk.

2.2.2

East/West Aspects. Growing (especially US)

concern for the defence of Western interests outside the

NATO area, and consciousness of the vulnerability of independent small states to Soviet, Cuban-backed or other

subversion, has strengthened their reluctance to see further proliferation of small, independent states unable to provide for their own defence; this concern is felt in spite of any difficulty HMG might have in deterring a

threat or mounting a rescue operation alone.

CONFIDENTIAL