CONFIDENTIAL
THE FUTURE OF THE REMAINING DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
I
INTRODUCTION
1 When the Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) team made their study of the future of the dependent territories in 1973 it was against the background of the remaining territories' reluctance to move to independence. Nine of the territories then examined have since achieved independence. For the rest, 17 in all (shown
on map at Annex A), the underlying conclusion of the PAR study that "the government should relieve itself of direct
responsibility for as many as possible of the remaining territories" continues to form the basis of UK policy. Yet no
active policy of withdrawal has been pursued in the intervening
years and indeed in that time the local governments of some of
the territories have become lethargic (and in certain cases
corrupt) at some cost to HMG. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the validity of current policy in relation to the
remaining dependent territories. It takes in a range of
considerations rather different from those of the Research
Department analysis on possible options (being submitted together
with this paper), which it is designed to complement, and reaches slightly different conclusions. For reasons more fully explained in paras 4-5 below, it focusses on the five territories in the
Caribbean as well as Bermuda, St Helena, Ascension, Tristan da
Cunha and the Pitcairn Group.
II
2
RECENT CHANGES
Pressures since 1973 have not been uniform. In some cases
they have reinforced the policy of withdrawal recommended by the PAR study; in other cases they have run in the opposite
direction.
2.1
Changes Since 1973 Favouring Withdrawal
2.1.1
Security. The Falklands episode demonstrated the
potentially high political and financial cost (not to
mention the cost in terms of loss of life) of defending a
dependent territory. Fortunately there are no comparable
territorial claims to the other islands. Equally none of
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