TNAG-1444-FCO40-1928-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1986 — Page 27

(b)

(c)

(d)

CONFIDENTIAL

that only the vocal minority will be heard; and

that those who are dissatisfied by the review's

outcome (in Hong Kong or elsewhere) will

subsequently accuse the Hong Kong Government

manipulating opinion to achieve a desired end.

of

to establish an independent Assessment Office,

on the lines of that set up in 1984 to assess

opinion on the Hong Kong Agreement. This

t་

-

is

one option which has been floated in the Hong

Kong press. Our initial view, and that of the

Hong Kong Government, is that it raises certain

serious difficulties particularly in that a

clear parallel would be established between the

future of Hong Kong and the 1987 Review, when

issues are comparable neither in

nor importance; and that Hong Kong

could be saddled with the need to create such

an office whenever an important issue arose

the two

substance

between now and 1997.

to have a referendum on direct elections as

some protagonists of greater "democratisation"

in Hong Kong suggest.

This seems neither

practicable nor desirable, and Hong Kong

officials are gently pouring cold water on the

idea.

to set up a

Government

direct

to

small separate unit within the

asses S public comment and report This is the option currently

to EXCO.

EO.

favoured by the Hong Kong Government. Such a

unit

might take the

wide variety of local

initiative and invite a

done

in

help to

a care ful and

groups to comment.

balanced way this could

If

avoid the risk that the unit will be

swamped by the views of one or more vocal and

strident minorities without the

majority being taken into account.

voice of the

CONFIDENTIAL