(b)
(c)
(d)
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that only the vocal minority will be heard; and
that those who are dissatisfied by the review's
outcome (in Hong Kong or elsewhere) will
subsequently accuse the Hong Kong Government
manipulating opinion to achieve a desired end.
of
to establish an independent Assessment Office,
on the lines of that set up in 1984 to assess
opinion on the Hong Kong Agreement. This
t་
-
is
one option which has been floated in the Hong
Kong press. Our initial view, and that of the
Hong Kong Government, is that it raises certain
serious difficulties particularly in that a
clear parallel would be established between the
future of Hong Kong and the 1987 Review, when
issues are comparable neither in
nor importance; and that Hong Kong
could be saddled with the need to create such
an office whenever an important issue arose
the two
substance
between now and 1997.
to have a referendum on direct elections as
some protagonists of greater "democratisation"
in Hong Kong suggest.
This seems neither
practicable nor desirable, and Hong Kong
officials are gently pouring cold water on the
idea.
to set up a
Government
direct
to
small separate unit within the
asses S public comment and report This is the option currently
to EXCO.
EO.
favoured by the Hong Kong Government. Such a
unit
might take the
wide variety of local
initiative and invite a
done
in
help to
a care ful and
groups to comment.
balanced way this could
If
avoid the risk that the unit will be
swamped by the views of one or more vocal and
strident minorities without the
majority being taken into account.
voice of the
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