TNAG-1425-FCO40-1908-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 225

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(d) Cambodia: Mr Pike believed that the Vietnamese attitude to

Cambodia was extremely unlikely to change in the near future. It was based on

(i) a firm ideological political viewpoint seeking

to unite Indo-China under one unit controlled from Hanoi;

(ii) the conviction that the Khmer Rouge were acting

as China's surrogates and the Vietnamese were therefore fighting Chinese expansionism in Cambodia;

(iii) acceptance that Vietnamese people in the South

were drifting across into Cambodia and establishing settlements on the East Bank of the Mekong. While not encouraging this, the Vietnamese Government condoned it and it established a foothold for them inside Cambodian territory. Mr Pike estimated that there were now some 100 to 200,000 Vietnamese settlers on Cambodian soil. He believed Prince Sihanouk's claim that there were some 500 to 600,000 Vietnam settlers to be grossly exaggerated. Mr Luce and Mr Pike agreed that we should take every opportunity to highlight this drift.

Mr Pike believed that the Vietnamese would not rest until all resistance movements in Cambodia had been driven out. They would make no concessions; they would seek to divide ASEAN and anyone who tried to mediate, ie the Australians, would be used for propaganda purposes. Describing the involvement of the Russians, Mr Pike said that they supplied all serious military equipment above handguns, all the necessary fuel, and military advice. The Vietnamese army could not operate without Russian support. The advantages to the Russians were, of course, that they had a foothold in Indo-China, at not too great an investment, and they possessed a client regime with the prestige of having defeated the Americans. The Vietnamese leadership was determined to carry on its association with the Russians but Mr Pike was aware of some feeling amongst the younger Vietnamese politicians of preference for greater freedom of action. Again, the Minister felt that we should highlight the extent of the Russians' involvement whenever the opportunity allowed.

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