TNAG-1418-FCO40-1901-Hong-Kong-Parliamentary-Sub-Committee-on-Race-Relations-and--1985 — Page 125

CONFIDENTIAL

MICK 243/2/

RECEIVED INERT CIS)

29.APR 1965

desk orfiere

JAY

INDEX

PA

70 akan

ра

or Locks

амал

Pne ar

Private Secretary

a.

Guð also

See

и

pana

Fr. Phillips

CRD

দি Mr. 2074

FROM P J WESTMACOTT

DATE: 23 April 1985

cc: PS/PUS

Sir W Harding

Dr Wilson

Mr Galsworthy, HKD

COPY

Mr Hartland-Swann, SEAD

FOR

CALL BY GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG ON MR LUCE, 23 APRIL

1. You may like to have a note of Sir E Youde's call on Mr Luce this morning, in advance of the Governor's call on the Secretary of State tomorrow.

SCORRI Report

2.

The Governor was glad that the Report had underlined the need for a coherent approach to the problem of Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. Unfortunately, although it had stressed the need for a continuing high off-take by third countries, it had not dwelt adequately on how to turn off the tap of refugees arriving from Vietnam. Unless this problem was tackled, any vacancies created by new admission programmes in Britain and elsewhere could well be filled by new arrivals. If, on the other hand, something could be done to stem the flow of arrivals, and the refugees in Hong Kong were perceived as a finite problem, it would be easier to persuade both Hong Kong and other countries to take larger numbers of the existing camp populations.

3.

Mr Luce explained the political difficulties which would arise if it became public knowledge that we were even talking to Hanoi about compulsory repatriation. The Governor and Mr Galsworthy argued that there could be some advantages for the Government in having tried this course (even though it was certain that Hanoi would not co-operate with such arrangements). Parliament would then understand that there was a choice: either more Vietnamese refugees were admitted to Britain or ways had to be found of stopping them arriving in Hong Kong.

Would it

4. Mr Luce suggested an alternative, package approach. be politically acceptable to combine a commitment to end the closed camps in Hong Kong, and to resettle the existing populations there, with a refusal to accept any new arrivals other than those who qualified for genuine refugee status? (Many of those currently arriving from Vietnam were economic migrants hoping for a passage to the United States rather than refugees proper.) The Governor thought this might be worth trying, but, again, the Vietnamese were unlikely to co-operate by restricting departures and agreeing not to penalise those who were sent back.

/5.

CONFIDENTIAL

((70)