TNAG-1416-FCO40-1897-The-financial-activities-of-Xu-Jiatun--Head-of-New-China-New-1985 — Page 16

TT HONG KONG

GRS 242

SECRET

TELELETTER

SECRET

22279 1

-

FROM A C GALSWORTHY, HKD

DATED 31 MAY 1985

FOLLOWING FOR JD I BOYD, DEPUTY POLITICAL ADVISER, HONG KONG

FINANCIAL AFFAIRS OF XU JIATUN

1. APOLOGIES FOR NOT REPLYING BEFORE TO YOUR LETTER OF 3 MAY

AND SUBSEQUENT TELELETTER OF 11 MAY.

LSON.

2. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH DAVID WILSON. OUR JOINT

FEELING IS THAT THERE ARE SOME DRAWBACKS TO THE APPROACH WHICH

YOU SUGGEST. WE WONDER WHETHER ONE EFFECT OF IT MIGHT NOT BE

THAT THE CHINESE WOULD BE STIMULATED TO ASK FOR FORMAL PRIVILEGES

AND IMMUNITIES FOR NCNA STAFF ON DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS. I IMAGINE

THAT SUCH A REQUEST WOULD BE UNWELCOME TO THE HONG KONG

GOVERNMENT, AND WE WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE TO TAKE A

COURSE WHICH MIGHT STIMULATE IT. WE ALSO WONDER WHETHER WE

REALLY WISH, AS YOU SUGGEST, TO POINT OUT TO XU THAT HE IS FREE

TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH WE REALISE THAT IT

IS THE LEGAL POSITION.

3. WE ALSO WONDER, IF IT IS NECESSARY TO APPROACH XU, WHETHER IT

MAKES MUCH SENSE TO WAIT UNTIL THE TIN TIN DAILY IS ON THE VERGE

OF COLLAPSE. MIGHT IT NOT THEN BE TOO LATE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT

IT?

4.LIKE YOU, WE THINK IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT A COMMUNIST BANK

WOULD PUT THE HEAD OF NCNA IN DOCK. THIS BEING SO WE ARE

INCLINED TO THINK IT MAY BE BETTER NOT TO MAKE AN APPROACH AT

ALL. I WONDER WHETHER YOU COULD HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE

QUESTION. IF OF COURSE YOU STILL CONSIDER THAT YOU NEED TO TALK

TO NCNA, WE WOULD CERTAINLY LOOK AT THE MATTER AGAIN.

SIGNED A C GALSWORTHY

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