TT HONG KONG
GRS 242
SECRET
TELELETTER
SECRET
22279 1
-
FROM A C GALSWORTHY, HKD
DATED 31 MAY 1985
FOLLOWING FOR JD I BOYD, DEPUTY POLITICAL ADVISER, HONG KONG
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS OF XU JIATUN
1. APOLOGIES FOR NOT REPLYING BEFORE TO YOUR LETTER OF 3 MAY
AND SUBSEQUENT TELELETTER OF 11 MAY.
LSON.
2. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH DAVID WILSON. OUR JOINT
FEELING IS THAT THERE ARE SOME DRAWBACKS TO THE APPROACH WHICH
YOU SUGGEST. WE WONDER WHETHER ONE EFFECT OF IT MIGHT NOT BE
THAT THE CHINESE WOULD BE STIMULATED TO ASK FOR FORMAL PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES FOR NCNA STAFF ON DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS. I IMAGINE
THAT SUCH A REQUEST WOULD BE UNWELCOME TO THE HONG KONG
GOVERNMENT, AND WE WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE TO TAKE A
COURSE WHICH MIGHT STIMULATE IT. WE ALSO WONDER WHETHER WE
REALLY WISH, AS YOU SUGGEST, TO POINT OUT TO XU THAT HE IS FREE
TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH WE REALISE THAT IT
IS THE LEGAL POSITION.
3. WE ALSO WONDER, IF IT IS NECESSARY TO APPROACH XU, WHETHER IT
MAKES MUCH SENSE TO WAIT UNTIL THE TIN TIN DAILY IS ON THE VERGE
OF COLLAPSE. MIGHT IT NOT THEN BE TOO LATE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT
IT?
4.LIKE YOU, WE THINK IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT A COMMUNIST BANK
WOULD PUT THE HEAD OF NCNA IN DOCK. THIS BEING SO WE ARE
INCLINED TO THINK IT MAY BE BETTER NOT TO MAKE AN APPROACH AT
ALL. I WONDER WHETHER YOU COULD HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE
QUESTION. IF OF COURSE YOU STILL CONSIDER THAT YOU NEED TO TALK
TO NCNA, WE WOULD CERTAINLY LOOK AT THE MATTER AGAIN.
SIGNED A C GALSWORTHY
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