TNAG-1411-FCO40-1887-Future-of-Hong-Kong--Hong-Kong-a-Change-of-Destiny---despatc-1985 — Page 15

CONFIDENTIAL

The negotiations leading up to

were

as the

the Joint Declaration

nineteen th century

as un equal for US

negotiations had been for the Chinese. The only

only card

we held was, as y ou say,

the Chinese wish to secure

an

agreement that would preserve the economic benefits they

derived from Hong Kong. There was never any doubt

however that it was in the end more

leaders to right what they s aw

humiliation

through the

important to their

as their national

reunification of Hong Kong with

the mainland than to preserve the economic benefits they

received from the territory. We therefore had to walk a

fine line in the negotiations between pressing hard for

what Hong Kong wanted, and on the other side not pushing

the Chinese to the point where they decided that the

price for agreement was too high. In this situation it]

was inherent that we could not afford to test any

hypothesis to destruction: we had to rely heavily on the

judgment of our negotiators as to what the Chinese could

ultimately be brought to accept. I am confident that the

constructive tension between London, reking and Hong Kong

for the most part produced the right answers. Despite

the weakness of Our bargaining position we achieved

remarkable concessions from the Chinese.

I will not easily forget my own involvement in the

negotiations, including my visits to Peking and Hong Kong

in the Spring and Summer of 1984.

Two events stick

particularly in my mind as turning points. The first was

the indication by Deng Xiaoping at my meeting with him on

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